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"Under Obama, [U.S.] foreign policy in Africa is based on four objec-
tives - needs, threats, responsibilities and opportunities. Needs are
energy for example, primarily in the form of fossil fuels, while
threats are climate change, narcotics and people trafficking, terror-
ism and disease. Responsibilities are the promotion and protection
of human rights, democracy and development and opportunities are
in the form of African dynamics, investments and access to mar-
kets. These objectives serve both regions and hold the most
importance to [U.S.] national interests concerning Africa. The cur-
rent [U.S.] policy priorities in Africa are democracy and governance,
conflict mitigation, economic growth and development, health is-
sues, transnational issues, climate change and woman's rights. The
[U.S.] policy approach is based on partnership and collaborative
diplomacy."'
I. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between the United States and Africa has largely
been defined by the historical intercourse of the global North and
South divide and how the results of that intercourse have played out in
the domestic social, economic and political milieu of the United States
and Africa. 2 Beginning in 1619, the first group of Africans were sold
into slavery in North America, and several million more were subse-
quently transported from Africa to the Americas during the Trans-
Atlantic Slave Trade.3 Colonialism followed and saw the "maximum
exploitation of the human and material resources of the continent [Af-
rica] and the appropriation of African peoples and territories."4 The
promise that man could live in freedom while pursuing his happiness
as a member of the human community has never really been realized
by Africans and Africa.5
1. Anton M. Pillay, Great Expectations: Examining Obama's Foreign Policy in Africa,
ConsultancyAfrica.com, www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com content&view
=article&id=764:great-expectations-examining-obamas-foreign-policy-in-africa-&catid=57:
africa-watch-discussion-papers&Itemid=263 (Last visited 10/04/2012).
2. 'The turning of Africa into a commercial warren for the hunting of black skins" was
one of the chief sources of "primitive accumulation" that "signaled the rosy dawn of the era
of capitalist production." See, Lena Weinstein, The New Scramble for Africa, 60 INT'L
SOCIALIST REV. (Aug. 2008), available at: http://www.isreview.org/issues/60/feat-africa.
shtml., quoting Karl Marx, CAPITAL VOL. I 915 (1977).
3. PETER J SCHRAEDER, Removing The Shackles? U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa
after the Cold War, in AFRICA IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER: RETHINKING STATE
SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY 187, 188 (Edmond J. Keller & Donald Rotchild eds., 1996).
4. Umozurike, U. 0. The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: Suggestions
for More Effectiveness, 13 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COmP. L. 8 (2007), available at: http://digital
commons.1aw.ggu.edulannlsurvey/voll3/iss1/8.
5. MOSES MOSKOWITZ, INTERNATIONAL CONCERN WITH HuMAN RIGHTS 1, 3 (1974).
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This failure has been due primarily to the warped structure of
the global North-South relationship, which has produced misfortunes
for the peoples of Africa. As aptly put by Nino,
[Tihese misfortunes occur not only because of the scarcity of re-
sources, but also because many use their fellow humans as just
another resource, either for their own benefit or to realize peculiar
visions of the absolute good. This practice of using men and women
as instruments is even more disastrous if, as often happens, it is
carried out by the powerful, by those who have access to weapons or
other means of subjecting other people to their will on a large
scale.6
In Africa, not even the noble causes of human rights promotion,
protection, or enforcement have been spared this misfortune in her re-
lationship with the global North in general and the United States in
particular. These historical dialectics have necessitated the present
excursion into the nature of the relationship between the United
States and Africa and into who stands to gain what, particularly with
President Barack Obama having been elected as President of the
United States in 2008.
President Obama's election as U.S. President was greeted with
great euphoria and a high expectation of change. While his election
was celebrated globally as marking a high point in the struggle against
racial discrimination and the clamour for equality in the United
States, it was particularly celebrated across Africa.7 Many ordinary
Africans naively saw President Obama, whose father is an African
from Kenya, as their African "son" who had become the occupant of the
highest political office in the world and leader of the free world. While
no one can take away President Obama's African heritage, informed
Africans are not naive to believe that President Obama is any less
American than other U.S. presidents before him regarding his Africa
policy thrust. With his sights now set on preparing for re-election for a
second term as U.S. President, it is important to ask what interests
President Obama's Africa policy has served during his first term of
office.
Because it is impossible to analyze the Obama administration's
policy on Africa relative to human rights, use of force and humanita-
rian intervention without considering the history of U.S.-Africa
6. CARLoS SANTIAGO NINO, THE ETHICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (1991).
7. Sebastion Berger, Kenya Declares National Holiday in Celebration of Barack
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relations, an article of this nature by implication must, from the outset,
set out the framework within which the U.S. has historically defined
its African policy. Accordingly, section I of this article introduces the
issue in this issue. Section II provides a historical background of the
United States' policy on Africa in order to situate the analysis in its
proper historical context and shed light on what factors have shaped,
and continue to shape, U.S.-Africa policy, as well as highlight the pol-
icy shifts as those factors have changed over time. Section III
considers the issue of human rights and the use of force in Africa vis-a-
vis U.S. policy. Section IV examines the Obama Administration's pol-
icy on Africa on two of the four major policy thrusts as outlined by the
administration and relevant to the subject discussed here, namely
human rights protection and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Sec-
tion V provides the authors' conclusions.
The authors of this article hold the view that the United States
has always defined its relations with Africa as a function of what pur-
pose Africa has served in the pursuit and realization of U.S. national
interests. As those interests have changed, Africa's relevance has
swung between obscurity and at best indifference for U.S. policymak-
ers and not even the election of an African-American U.S. President
will change that. This philosophy cuts across the entire spectrum of
U.S.-African policy including human rights, use of force and humanita-
rian intervention.
II. THE UNITED STATES, AFRICA AND THE IDEA OF HuITMAN RIGHTS IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
One of the greatest achievements of the Twentieth Century was the
advancement of human rights. The United Nations Charter, together
with the International Bill of Rights, ushered in an era of internation-
alization of human rights with a momentum never seen before.8 From
the north to the south, the shackles of colonial domination were broken
8. "[tlo reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the
human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small. . ."
See, U.N. Charter Preamble, 1st plen. mtg, adopted on June 24, 1945 in San Francisco and
came into force on October 24 1945. See also, U.N. Charter art. 2, 56. (duties of Member
States and the United Nations to promote human rights); The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217217217(III)A, U.N. Doc.A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI)A (Dec.
16, 1966); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), G.A.
Res. 2200 (XXI)A (Dec.16, 1966); The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260 (III)A December (Dec. 9, 1948). There are a plethora of
other International Committee of the Red Cross instruments and UNGA Declarations that
today form part of customary international law and international human rights law corpus.
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in Africa, racial segregation dethroned in the United States and the
flames of apartheid extinguished in South Africa. In the 1960s and
1970s, women's liberation movements engendered gender equality as
the Third World agitated for solidarity rights, and in particular the
right to development gained momentum.9 The United States played a
key role in all of these events and Africa was considered only ab-
stractly, relegated to either a positive or negative impact, depending on
United States' interests.
As the only major power that emerged relatively unscathed
from World War II, the United States was the chief architect of the
new international legal and economic order, driving the process for the
creation of most of the intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and in-
stitutions that emerged after World War II, such as the United Nations
(UN), the Bretton Woods Institutions, the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (GATT) agreement and many more.10 Thus, the United
States had the historic opportunity to design global institutions that
would shape the future of its inter-state relations, allowing it to estab-
lish a framework which would ensure that American values and
interests would always be protected.11 Though sometimes universal
and in congruence with those of other states, the fact that these values
were not always pursued in the common interests, despite rhetoric to
the contrary, was manifested in the ensuing Cold War, and the impact
is still felt to this day more in Africa than in nearly any other locale.
As most African states emerged from colonial rule in the 1960s,
they looked up to the United States as the champion of human rights,
as the United States had been instrumental to the creation of all of the
most fundamental international human rights instruments. 12 But Af-
rican states first had cause to seriously call American credentials into
question when the United States opposed the Third World agitation for
a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and the demand for a
right to development.13 It stands to reason that since post-colonial Af-
9. For a detailed discussion of the subject, See Generally, PHILIP ALSTON, RYAN
GOODMAN & HENRY I. STEINER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS,
MORALS (3d ed., 2007); RicHARD B. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF
LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE (2ed., 1991); SOHN L.B & BUERGENTHAL T., INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1973); Thomas Buergenthal, The Evolving International
Human Rights System, AM. J. INT'L L. 783-807 (2006).
10. MARGARET P KARNS & A MINGST, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: THE POLITICS
AND PROCESSES OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 258 (2d ed., 2010).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 492; See also the major international human rights instruments supra note 8.
13. S.B.O. Gunro, Violations of Human Rights in the Third World: Responsibilities of
States and TNCs in THIRD WORLD ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERNATIONAL LAw: AN
INTRODUCTION 275, 276 (Frederick E. Snyder & Surakiart Sathirathai eds., 1987); See also
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rican states had suffered historical injustices that contributed to the
present malaise on the continent, it was only fair that they should de-
mand a NIEO that allowed them to participate in the distribution of
global wealth. 14
But realizing that a recognition of the right to development as a
human right would impose a corresponding duty on the United States
(and other countries of the global North) to transfer resources, knowl-
edge and technology to the South (particularly Africa), the United
States vehemently opposed almost every attempt by the UN to create
or sponsor institutions and programs that would facilitate the recogni-
tion of the right to development as a human right. 15 To this end, the
United States waged an intellectual-cum-ideological war against the
South that undermined the West's recognition of the human right to
development. 16
Whenever concerns of civil and political rights stood in the way
of advancing the United States' national interests, such rights were
often crushed ruthlessly. The promotion and protection of human
rights in Africa by the United States has historically been subject to
the United States' national interests. Post-colonial African history is
replete with instances of United States providing support for some of
the most brutal dictators and regimes with the worst human rights
records, such as Mobutu Seseko of Zaire, the Jonas Savimbi-led Na-
tional Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and
Mohamed Farar Aideed of Somalia, all of whom were clients of the
United States at one time or another and for as long as they furthered
the United States' national interests.1 7 In the late 1980s, the govern-
ment of Aideed was the beneficiary of millions of U.S. dollars and
CLARENCE CLYDE FERGUSON JR., Redressing Global Injustices: The Role of Law, in THIRD
WORLD ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 365, 369-370 (Frederick
E. Snyder & Surakiart Sathirathai eds., 1987); PHILIP ALSTON, The Right to Development at
the International Level in THIRD WORLD ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION 811, 811 (Frederick E. Snyder & Surakiart Sathirathai eds., 1987).
14. CLARENCE CLYDE FERGUSON JR., Redressing Global Injustices: The Role of Law in
THIRD WORLD ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 363, 365, 371
(Frederick E. Snyder & Surakiart Sathirathai eds., 1987).
15. Id. at 374, 375.
16. The fallout from this conflict has had the effect that the U.S. has refused to ratify
the ICESCR to this day. See generally, John-Mark lyi, Right to Development: Myth or
Reality? (June 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
17. Ved P. Nanda, Thomas F. Muther Jr. & Amy Eckert, Tragedies in Somalia,
Yugoslavia, Haiti, Rwanda and Liberia -Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian
Intervention under International Law Part II, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 827, 831
(1997/98). See also Rick Rozoff, AFRICOM: Pentagon Prepares Direct Military Intervention
in Africa, STOP NATO (Aug. 24, 2009), http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/09/02/africom-
pentagons-prepares-direct-military-intervention-in-africal.
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weapons. This aid is partially responsible for the intractable Somali
conflict and the conflict in the Horn of Africa region today.18 Samuel
Doe of Liberia was a long time beneficiary of U.S. aid while he ran a
brutal dictatorship that eventually plunged Liberia into a bloody civil
war, only to see that when the war started the United States promptly
evacuated its nationals, becoming passive bystander in a war it helped
promulgate.19 And more recently, what can be said of the United
States' human rights policy and support for Hosni Mubarak of Egypt,
can, perhaps to a lesser degree, be said of the defunct apartheid regime
in South Africa.
Thus, from a historical standpoint, the United States' human
rights policy towards Africa is mixed. As was once said of the history of
the development of equitable principles under English law, "it is a
roguish thing" that varies not only with the convictions of the U.S.
President, but also on the world view of the incumbent U.S. Secretary
of State.20 "[T]he dynamics of [U.S.] domestic politics-including presi-
dential leadership (or the lack thereof), executive-legislative relations,
lobbying by domestic groups, and public opinion," depends on many
amorphous and often vague variables. 21 Whatever the administration
and whatever its foreign policy thrust, there is just one constant inter-
est, and that is U.S. national interest. This context is important
because as we examine President Obama's human rights policy in Af-
rica, it would be instructive to bear in mind that no matter what a
particular U.S. administration professes,
[TIhe U.S. and organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation (NATO) have [always] 'served domestic political purposes by
creating a web of international entanglements and domestic sup-
18. Ken Menkhaus, Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State
Building, and the Politics of Coping, 31 (3) INT'L SEC. 74, 80 (Winter 2006/7).
19. Max A. Sesay, Civil War and Collective Intervention in Liberia, 23(67) REv. AFR.
POL. ECON. 35, 40 (1996); CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND THE USE OF FORCE 211
(2d ed., 2004).
20. "Equity is a Roguish thing, for Law we have a measure know what to trust too.
Equity is according to the conscience of him who is Chancellor, and as that is larger or
narrower soe is equity. Tis all one as if they should make the Standard for the measure wee
call A foot, to be the Chancellors foot; what an uncertain measure would this be; One
Chancellor has a long foot another A short foot a third an indifferent foot; tis the same thing
in the Chancellors Conscience" quoted in H. Jefferson Powell, "Cardozo's Foot": The
Chancellor's Conscience and Constructive Trusts 56(3) LAW & CONTEMP. Peous 7, 7 (1993)
concluding that the principles of 'equity varies with the size of the foot of the Chancellor of
the Exchequer'. The term of Henry Kissinger as U.S. Secretary of State and the Presidency
of George W. Bush illustrate this point.
21. KARNS & MINGST, supra note 10, at 261.
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port constituencies that have influenced successive
administrations' policies. 2 2
The implication is that no matter what is contained in the pol-
icy formulation, even the Obama Administration's foreign policy
direction relating to human rights in Africa is ultimately shaped and
directed by the same forces. The established pattern and continual
U.S.-focused attitude has been made manifest in the United States' ap-
proach to the protection and enforcement of human rights in Africa.
A convenient place to begin this survey might be the post-UN
Charter era by which time most African countries had emerged from
colonial domination and the Cold War was raging. 23 From President
Dwight D. Eisenhower to President John F. Kennedy to President Ron-
ald Reagan, U.S. presidents during the Cold War viewed Africa with
indifference and their policies consistently reflected apathy. 24 Africa
only retained relevance in the United States when Cold War politics
required the United States to build spheres of influence to check the
spread of Soviet communism.25 U.S. policy towards Africa during the
Cold War era was consistent, coherent and based on the "twin pillars of
anticommunism and containment."26 Irrespective of whether the in-
cumbent was a Democrat or a Republican, the United States realized
the strategic significance of Africa in its ideological war with the Soviet
Union and its foreign policy towards Africa was consequently tailored
around the containment theory. This theory became the rationale for
the United States' armed interventions and use of force on the African
continent.27 Outside the context of using African states as sandbags
against communism, or as theatres of East-West confrontations, U.S.
policymakers always conceived Africa as insignificant and undeserving
of any serious commitment or engagement. 28 To quote Peter
Schraeder,
Rather than view African countries as important in their own right,
[U.S.] policymakers saw them as a means for preventing the future
advances of Soviet communism; therefore [U.S.] relationships with
22. Id. at 258.
23. For an analysis of the events shaping Africa in this period and the role of the West,
see generally, MARTIN MEREDITH, THE STATE OF AFRICA: A HISTORY OF THE CONTINENT
SINCE INDEPENDENCE (2005).
24. SCHRAEDER, supra note 2, at 188.
25. Id. at 191.
26. Id. at 187.
27. Id. at 191.
28. Id. at 192.
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African regimes advanced according to their relative importance
within an East-West framework. 29
The United States propped up many regimes on the continent
and helped them maintain power. For example, for over thirty years
the government of Haile Selassie of Ethiopia was a client of the United
States until relations broke down and the United States began to court
the government of Siad Barre of Somalia in order to gain access to ba-
ses that would help stall any Soviet threats in the Horn of Africa and
secure lanes for Middle East oil.30 The United States offered its sup-
port to these ruthless dictators, regardless of their appalling human
rights records, and provided that they align with the United States
during the Cold War rivalry.31 Again, Schraeder asserts, "[iln each of
these cases, an overriding preoccupation with anticommunism led
Washington to overlook the authoritarian excesses of these regimes in
favour of their willingness to support [U.S.] containment policies in
Africa. 32
So, the assertion that in the past, the United States had no co-
herent foreign policy on Africa other than a patchwork of reactive
rather than proactive measures is hardly sustainable.3 3 What is prob-
ably true of U.S. policy during those periods is that Africa was not
considered important unless a U.S. national interest was at stake.
How much did this change in the post-Cold War sole-superpower
world?
One would not even have to look far to come to the conclusion
that, if ever Africa was of importance to the United States, it ceased
being so after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The first decade after
the Cold War saw Africa slip further on the national interest ranking
of the United States. "Africa was a national interest backwater," and
successive administrations more or less pursued a policy of disengage-
ment from the continent. 34 As pointed out above, during the
heightened tensions of the Cold War, Africa was not considered as stra-
tegically important for its own sake. The United States' foreign policy
on Africa was pursued not because of the interest in Africa as an end





33. Sandra T. Barnes, Global Flows: Terror, Oil, and Strategic Philanthropy, 48 AFR.
STUD., no. 1, 2005 at 2.
34. Nicolas van de Walle, U.S. Policy Towards Africa: The Bush Legacy and the Obama
Administration, 109 AFR. AFF., no. 434, 1 (2009).
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portant ends of the United States' national interests. In a post-Cold
War world, one may question the relevance of African policy to the
United States' political regime. As Letitia Lawson rightfully notes,
[D]uring the Cold War, United States foreign policy toward Sub-
Saharan Africa had little to do with Africa. As with other develop-
ing regions, African countries were first and foremost pawns in the
great global chess game. Republican and Democratic Administra-
tions alike supported American clients and sought to undermine
Soviet ones.35
It is not surprising that U.S. policy shifted towards minimum
engagement in Africa during the 1990s following the Cold War.3 6 Evi-
dence of this gradual disengagement was manifested not only in the
reduction of aid to Africa, which reached an all-time low in 1996, and a
decrease in the number of U.S. embassies across Africa, but also in the
quantity and quality of diplomats that staffed these embassies.37 This
buttresses the fact that despite the client-patron relationship that
characterized U.S.-African policy from the 1950s to the late 1980s, Af-
rica's relevance had to be tied to some other considerations to warrant
the attention of U.S. policymakers. In fact, this view was so en-
trenched that the mantra was said to revolve around three canons of
U.S.-African policy in the state department and relevant agencies:"(a)
Do not spend much money [on Africal unless Congress makes you[;]
(b)Do not let African issues complicate policy toward other more impor-
tant parts of the world[; and] (c) Do not take stands that might create
political controversies in the United States."38 Contrary to how the
United States treated most other regions in the world, Africa was pig-
eon-holed in a crises-cum-humanitarian response compartment to be
addressed only when convenient and beneficial.39
35. Letitia Lawson, U.S. Africa Policy Since the Cold War, 6(1) STRATEGIC INSIGHTS






36. LAUREN PLOCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34003, AFRICA COMMAND: U.S.
STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND THE ROLE OF THE U.S. MILITARY IN AFRICA 13 (2011), available
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34003.pdf.
37. van de Walle, supra note 34, at 5.
38. Michael Clough, The United States and Africa: The Policy of Cynical
Disengagement 91(565), CURRENT HIsT. 193, 195 (1992) as adapted in SCHRAEDER, supra
note 2, at 195.
39. SCHRAEDER, supra note 3, at 195.
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III. THE UNITED STATES' ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE USE OF FORCE AND
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA
A long-standing argument exists among academics regarding the ex-
tent to which force may be used by a state or group of states which act
to protect the citizens of another state endangered by mass atrocities
at the hands of their own government. 4 0 The controversy revolves
around two competing norms in the UN Charter, which are: (1) the
maintenance of international peace and security through the peaceful
settlement of international disputes, and (2) prohibition of threat of
force or use of force on the one hand, and the respect for state sover-
eignty and the protection of human rights on the other.41
This controversy is due to the apparently irreconcilable interna-
tional law norms enshrined in Article 2, section (4) and Article 2,
section (7) of the UN Charter and the obligation imposed by Articles 55
and 56.42 But the view that sovereignty and non-intervention were im-
mutable thrived because inter-state conflict was perceived as a threat
to international peace and security. 43 However, this view has since
changed given that most conflicts that spawn humanitarian disasters
since the inception of the UN Charter and the end of the Cold War
have been intra-state rather than inter-state conflicts, especially in Af-
40. There is an enormous volume of literature on humanitarian intervention debate
both from international relations and international law perspectives. See e.g., IAN
BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE By STATES (1963); SIMoN
CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR UNJUST PEACE? HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002); FERNANDO R. TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY
INTO LAW AND MORALITY (2d ed., 1997); OLIVER RAMSBOTHAN & TOM WOODHOUSE
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS: A RECONCEPTUALIZATION
(1996); NICHOLAS J. WHEELER, SAVING STRANGERS: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (2000); KOFI FRANCIS ABIEW, THE EVOLUTION AND PRACTICE OF THE
DOCTRINE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (1999); George Wright, A Contemporary Theory
of Humanitarian Intervention, 4 FLA. INT'L L.J. 435 (1988-9); Nicholas Onuf, Humanitarian
Intervention: The Early Years, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L.753 (2004); Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v.
Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9); Barcelona Traction Case (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4 (Feb. 5);
Case of Military and Paramilitary Activities and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.v. US), 1986 ICJ
14 (June 27).
41. Reisman asserts that human rights emerged victorious in this normative struggle.
See Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law,
84(4) Am. J. INT'L L. 866, 868 (1990); Christine Ellerman, Command of Sovereignty Gives
Way to Concern for Humanity, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 346, 350 (1993-4).
42. THOMAS G. WEISS, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 22-23 (2nd ed. 2007).
43. NICHOLAS WHEELER, The Humanitarian Responsibilities of Sovereignty: Explaining
the Development of a New Norm of Military Intervention for Humanitarian Purposes in
International Society in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 29, 33
(Jennifer Welsh ed., 2004).
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rica.44 Thus, the new threat to international peace and security has
come from another source: conflicts stemming from violations of
human rights. 45
In Liberia, for example, the rampant violations of human rights
by the Doe regime led to a brutal civil war that unfortunately did not
attract the sympathy of the United States, despite long historical ties
between the two countries. 46 In fact, the official policy of the United
States was that the conflict was an internal affair which only Liberians
were best suited to deal with. However, the real reason for the United
States' non-intervention was that Liberia, a former client of the United
States during the Cold War, was insignificant to the United States as
it prioritized the Iraqi invasion of oil-rich Kuwait. 47 The United States
mobilized the international community through the UN to intervene
and halt the Iraqi aggression and stopped Saddam Hussein's atrocities
against Iraqi Kurds.48 At the same time, however,, Liberians and
West Africa grappled with the bloody Liberian civil war with little or
no interest by the United States, obviously because it had no interest
in Liberia.49 The case of Somalia is well documented and will not be
rehashed here,50 but it suffices to mention that the death of 18 U.S.
soldiers that led to the termination of the mission could only be evi-
dence of the reality that Africa is indeed the "backwater of U.S. foreign
policy," at least when compared to the material and human resources
committed by the United States to other missions elsewhere.5 '
An important unintended consequence of the United States' ex-
periences in Operation Restore Hope, Unified Task Force (UNITAF)
and United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNSOME II) was the Presi-
dential Decisions Directive (PDD) 25 in which President Bill Clinton
44. Marrack Goulding, The United Nations and Conflict in Africa Since the Cold War,
98(391) AFR. AFF. 155, 160 (1999); Peter Wallensteen & Margaret Sollenberg, Armed
Conflict, 1989-99 35(5) JOURNAL OF PEACE 635, 637 (2000).
45. Antonio Cassese, Human Rights in a Changing World 85 (1990).
46. Max A Sesay, supra note 18, at 35.
47. Id. at 41.
48. Thomas G. Weiss, supra note 42, at 41.
49. Comfort Ero, ECOWAS and the Subregional Peacekeeping in Liberia, THE JOURNAL
OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (1995), available at http://www.jha.ad1995/09/25/ecowas-
and-the-subregional-peacekeeping-in-liberia.
50. For a detailed account of what went wrong with the Somali Mission, see MOHAMED
SAHNOUN, SoMALIA: THE MISSED OPPORTUNITIES (1994).
51. Physicians for Human Rights, Somalia: No Mercy In Mogadishu: The Human Cost
Of The Conflict And The Struggle For Relief, AFRICA WATCH (March 1992), available at
http://www.cja.org/downloads/No%20Mercy%20for%2OMogadishu.pdf.
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clarified the foreign policy thrust of the United States.5 2 The essential
provisions of the directive provided that
[T]he United States will vote in the UN Security Council for multi-
lateral peace operations, or, where appropriate, take the lead in
calling for them, when member states are prepared to support the
effort with forces and funds; when the U.S. decides that the opera-
tion's political and military objectives are clear and feasible; and
when UN involvement represents the best means to advance U.S.
interests. The U.S. will not support in the Security Council propos-
als for UN involvement in situations where such involvement is not
viable or when it would interfere with U. S. interests.53
This policy framework has undergirded subsequent U.S. inter-
vention, or lack thereof, to protect human rights in Africa ever since,
and it is not clear that there has been a significant policy shift irrespec-
tive of the political party in office. The first casualty of this policy was
Rwanda, and the ignoble role played by the United States in order to
avoid intervention and also prevent UN intervention is well docu-
mented. 5 4 The conflict in Darfur that erupted in 2003 has not
attracted any significant engagement from the United States beyond
the rhetoric of "never again" and diplomatic shuttle in Washington.
This is underscored by the fact that despite labelling the humanitarian
catastrophe in Darfur as genocide, the United States has succeeded in
avoiding the corresponding obligations imposed by Article 1 of the Ge-
nocide Convention which require the United States to take steps
(including intervention) to prevent, halt and punish the crime of geno-
cide in Darfur.55 Again, this demonstrates the implementation of PDD
25's policy that where U.S. national interests are not at stake, human
rights violations including mass atrocities, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity are insufficient to persuade meaningful United
States intervention. In fact, the Rwandan genocide shows how the
United States could become an obstructionist to UN action in genocides
in Africa in cases where the United States determines that its national
interests are not at stake.5 6
Outside the Cote d'Ivoire conflict of 2002, the Darfur genocide
can pass for the third African state victim of PDD 25. The humanita-
rian crises of the 1990s could not push Africa upward on the United
States' foreign policy agenda. Given these antecedents, there is need
52. White House, U.S. Policy On Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations,
Presidential Decision Directive 25 (May 3 1994).
53. Id. at 2.
54. Physicians for Human Rights, supra note 51.
55. Michael Clough, supra note 38.
56. Wheeler, supra note 40, at 215- 216.
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to question the Obama Administration's foreign policy on Africa in the
context of the recent U.S. decision to send troops to Uganda and the
U.S.-initiated NATO intervention in Libya.
The next section of this article considers how much the U.S. pol-
icy discussed above has changed and what accounts for that change. To
what extent do human right considerations determine U.S. policy in
Africa? Or, is the policy mainly driven by the United States' national
interests? Has the Obama Administration fashioned a new policy for
human rights protection and the use of force in Africa? If so, to what
extent does it detract from what has been discussed above and in
whose interest has there been a policy shift? The section will demon-
strate that just as the Cold War shaped U.S.-Africa policy in the past,
two events have forced and determined the direction of the United
States' foreign police on Africa in the last decade - namely, the rise of
China and the events of September 11, 2001.57
IV. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND OBAmA AFRICA POLICY
As previously discussed above, the doctrine of humanitarian in-
tervention has been one of the most controversial subjects of
international law. Many questions surround its legal validity and
when it is justified to use force in the protection of human rights. But
the most potent argument of opponents of the doctrine is its suscepti-
bility to abuse. It is a common contention that humanitarian
intervention can only be a banner for the propagation of war by power-
ful states.58 This argument is based on the realist theory that states
would only act when it is in their national interest to do so.59 When
this theory is applied to humanitarian intervention, the end result is
that irrespective of what an intervening state proclaims to be its mo-
tives, its true intentions and motivation will always be some form of
national self-interest, be it political or economic; implicit, or explicit.60
This view was well articulated in President Clinton's PDD 25 and simi-
lar foreign policy documents of governments around the world.6 1
Regardless of what is actually contained in the Obama Administra-
57. John Prendergast, Old Wine in New Bottles - U.S. Policy Towards Africa after 9/11
and Iraq in GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND AFRICA: REPORT OF THE 2004 TswALu DIALOGUE 109
(Richard Cobbold & Greg Mills eds., 2004).
58. Thomas Franck & Nigel S. Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian
Intervention by Military Force, 67(2) Am. J. IN'L L. 275, 279, 294 (1973).
59. Wheeler, supra note 40, at 46.
60. Id. at 30.
61. PDD 25, supra note 52.
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tion's policy on Africa, the practical effect is that it has simply
continued along the same lines as previous policies.
In outlining his foreign policy on Africa on his first trip to
Ghana in 2009, President Obama stated, "I will focus on four areas
that are critical to the future of Africa and the entire developing world:
democracy; opportunity; health; and the peaceful resolution of conflict.
First, we must support strong and sustainable democratic govern-
ments."62 The President's commitment to this policy thrust and the
modus operandi for its implementation, particularly with regard to the
promotion of democracy and the peaceful resolution of conflict, did not
have to wait long to be tested.
The Arab Spring and the role played by the United States in it
clearly indicates that the United States' foreign policy on Africa re-
mains unchanged and is ultimately determined by the United States'
national interests rather than as contained in the rhetoric of President
Obama's Africa policy document. Prior to the Arab Spring, the United
States had supported Hosni Mubarak's Egyptian government, viewing
it as a bulwark of strategic balance between Arabs and Israel in the
Middle East, and thus a beacon of regional peace and stability.63
Hence for the first few weeks of the Egyptian revolution, the United
States' position oscillated between studied passivity and a "wait and
see" approach. 64 As Egypt was the only Arab nation that had a peace
treaty with Israel, it was the strategic calculation of the Obama Ad-
ministration that a rush to side with the revolution against Hosni
Mubarak - a long-time tested and trusted ally - could be counter-pro-
ductive if the revolution failed.65 At the same time, it was also felt that
failure by the United States to side with the revolutionaries would
paint it in a bad light and confirm the long-time assertion by many
Egyptians and observers that the United States' commitment to the
promotion of human rights and the rule of law and democracy in the
Middle East and North Mrica (MENA) was only true to the extent that
it served to maintain the status quo of preserving the delicate balance
62. White House, Office of the Press Secretary. Remarks by the President to the
Ghanaian Parliament Accra International Conference Centre Accra, Ghana (July 11, 2009)
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/re,arks-president-ghanaian-
parliament, (emphasis added).
63. Egypt is the only country in the Middle East that has a peace treaty with Israel,
and there were probably fears in Washington that the exit of Hosni Mubarak might
jeopardize this delicate peace in the region.
64. See Speech by President Barack Obama on January 28, 2011, available at http:l
www.whitehouse.gov.
65. This can be contrasted with the attitude of the U.S. to the subsequent crisis in
Libya.
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of power in the region in the interest of Israel. If achieving this objec-
tive meant keeping Hosni Mubarak in power despite his poor human
rights records, then so be it. Thus, the United States' interests in
MENA must have trumped all other considerations, including the pro-
tection of millions of Egyptians who had been victims of Mubarak's
human rights violations.
The above explains why the United States had to wait until
such a time that there were indications of the likely outcome of the
revolution before it came out with an official position pressuring
Mubarak to step down from power.66 Crucial to this decision was the
role of the powerful Egyptian military, whose position clearly indicated
that it sided with the people - a clear sign of the possible success of the
revolution. 67 It must have been a tough decision for the Obama admin-
istration to withdraw its support for Hosni Mubarak, a long-time ally
of Israel in the region. Perhaps, the main reason the U.S. abandoned
Mubarak in the wake of the revolution was because the U.S. feared a
possible backlash and accusation of hypocrisy and double-standards if
she failed to support a people's pro-democratic revolution in Egypt
while pretending to promote the same values elsewhere. The United
States eventually adopted the position it did because it was the only
way it was going to retain any credibility and leverage with the succes-
sor to the Mubarak regime.
This view is supported by events in Yemen where the United
States has also been ambivalent in its response to the crisis, sparking
angry criticisms from protesters in the streets of Sanai.68 In fact, the
nature of the U.S.-Yemeni arrangement by which the latter provides a
military base for the United States in the region is such that an inde-
pendent observer cannot help but conclude that it undermines the
latter's sovereignty. This explains why, despite the death toll arising
from the Yemeni uprising, we will not see a Libyan-style intervention
in Yemen. Rather, we see an arrangement that is in the interest of the
United States whereby the president of Yemen would receive immu-
nity from prosecution in exchange for stepping down from power.69
Hundreds of people have been killed just like in Libya and yet, Yemeni
66. Jeremy Bowen, Egypt Unrest: Obama Increases Pressure on Mubarak, BBC NEWS,
February 5, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-12371479.
67. Lyse Doucet, Egypt Protests: Army Rules out the Use of Violence, BBC NEWS, Jan.
31, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12330169.
68. Sudarsan Raghavan, In Yemen, Anger from Activists Over U.S. Policy, THE
WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 21, 2011, http://www.washiingtonpost.com/worldlin-yemen-anger-
from-activists.
69. Yemen's President Saleh Arrives in U.S. for Treatment, BBC NEWS, Jan. 29, 2012,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16778286.
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President Saleh refused to step down and reneged on promises of step-
ping down several times. 70 Apparently, the United States' latest move
was probably aimed at giving Mr. Saleh a "soft landing" by which he
received permission to visit the U.S. for "medical treatment," in ex-
change for him never returning to power in Yemen.71 This is in sharp
contrast with the United States' attitude to the revolution in Libya.
Just as the Bush Administration espoused "pre-emptive self-defense
and regime change," the Obama Administration should take credit for
its use of force in Libya to enforce its responsibility to "protect" the
Libyan people.
The emerging norm of the responsibility to protect was con-
ceived to prevent mass atrocities like Rwanda, Sebrenica, and Darfur,
and the doctrine has developed very quickly.72 The NATO Operation
Odyssey Dawn is the first use of force to implement the "responsibility
to protect" norm.73 The norm was first developed by Francis Deng and
his colleagues at the Brookings Institution in their seminal work, Sov-
ereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa.74 The
responsibility to protect norm essentially reconceptualized the contro-
versial doctrine of humanitarian intervention by shifting the emphasis
from a right to intervene which was seen as an affront to sovereignty to
the conception of sovereignty as entailing the duty of a state to protect
its citizens.75 In this sense, there is a shared responsibility which rests
primarily on the host state to protect its people and secondarily, on the
international community to do so when the state is unable or unwilling
to protect its people.76
The doctrine was formally endorsed by world leaders in 2005 in
the World Summit Outcome Document and by the UN Security Council
70. Id.
71. The norm is still controversial and its scope a subject of debate.
72. The norm 'responsibility to protect' (hereafter R2P) is based on the report on a
commission set up by the Canadian Government to re-examine humanitarian intervention
and prevention of mass atrocities. See THE RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECT: REPORT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY (2001) (hereafter
ICISS Report).
73. Alex J Bellamy, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the
Norm, 25(3) ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 263, 264 (2011).
74. FRANCIS M. DENG ET AL, SOVEREIGNTY As RESPONSIBILITY: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
IN AFRICA (1996).
75. Mohammed Ayoob, Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty, 6(1) INT'L J.
HM. RTs. 81, 84 (2002). For a detailed analysis of the R2P norm and its components, see
generally the Report of the CISS, Gareth Evans, THE RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECT (2008).
76. Supra note 71, at 13.
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through resolution 1674 and 1976.77 The doctrine seeks to deploy
three tools: the responsibility to prevent (which involves a range of
tools from preventive diplomacy and persuasion to economic assistance
to enable the host state carry out this responsibility), the responsibility
to react (which involves the use of force as a last resort), and the re-
sponsibility to rebuild (which deals with state reconstruction in a post-
conflict situation).78 Once more, the most contentious aspect of the
doctrine has been the use of force to protect human rights.79 Though
the African groups had been the most vociferous supporter of the doc-
trine, there were those who foresaw a future Libyan situation and
promptly, and perhaps rightly too, warned about the likelihood of
abuse of the doctrine.80 President Susilo Bambang Yudhuyono of Indo-
nesia cautioned, "We need a consensus on the responsibility to protect
people from genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
To this end, force should be used only when all other means have
failed."
Even without the statements of dictators and autocrats at the
Summit, many states believed that the principle was likely to be
abused. This view reflects the fear and suspicion of most small states
about the possible use to which the doctrine could be put.81 Rightly so,
the fear was that given the unrepresentative and undemocratic nature
of the composition of the UN Security Council, the doctrine could be
manipulated to pursue ulterior economic and political agendas such as
regime change.82 In fact, the Arab Spring and the reaction of the UN
and powerful states is a classic example of all the intrigues and anxie-
ties expressed by many delegates at the World Summit.
The intervention in Libya, supposedly "authorized" by UN Se-
curity Council Resolution 1973, was aimed at enforcing the
responsibility to protect the human rights of the Libyan people since
the Gaddafi regime had failed to do so, or was the direct violator of
77. See 1138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document (2005) A/60/L.1 15th
September 2005; S/RES 1674/(2006) Apr. 28 2006 on the Protection of Civilians in Armed
Conflicts; S/RES/1894/(2009) Nov.11 2009; UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/63/308
on the Responsibility to Protect.
78. Supra note 7,1 at 29.
79. Id.
80. See the comments of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and Robert Mugabe
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those rights.8 3 But this raises significant questions about the right to
protect. First, the right to protect norm is built on the incremental
approach outlined in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which provides
that non-coercive measures must first be deployed and that the use of
force is to be a last resort.84 Thus, "tough threshold conditions should
be satisfied before military intervention is contemplated. For political,
economic and judicial measures, the barrier can be set lower, but for
military intervention it must be high: for military action ever to be de-
fensible, the circumstances must be grave indeed."85 The report set out
other elaborate precautionary principles, but it is doubtful that the
Obama Administration, in its apparent haste to get rid of an old foe,
paid heed to any of these principles.
Second, the responsibility to protect doctrine does not envisage
siding with one party in a civil war in order to change the outcome.
The United States, under President Obama and its NATO allies, pro-
viding arms, training, and logistics to the rebels during the Libyan
crisis, despite the existence of UN Security Council Resolution 1970
which imposed an arms embargo on all sides to the conflict.86 There
was no other UN Security Council Resolution backing this action and
by no stretch of the imagination could Resolution 1973 have been re-
lied upon to justify the military aid. Therefore, the United States'
action in provided arms and training to the Libyan rebels was illegal
under international law and violated Resolution 1970. From the time
that France recognized the rebels (National Transition Council) up to
the commencement of actual bombings, there was a de facto and de
jure government in effective control in Libya and it was a brazen viola-
tion of international law to attack the Libyan forces.
Third, even as vaguely worded as Resolution 1973 is, there is no
doubt that its scope did not encompass regime change. The relevant
operative paragraph of the Resolution provides:
Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting na-
tionally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and
acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all neces-
sary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970
(2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under
threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Ben-
83. S/RES/1973/(2011) See U.N. Security Council Resolution S/RES/1973/(2011),
available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/docUNDOC/GEN/N11/268/39/PDF/N1126839.pdf?
OpenElement.
84. See supra note 71, at 29.
85. Id.
86. Obama not ruling out Libya arms, BBC NEws, Mar. 30, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-africa-12902450.
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ghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any
part of Libyan territory, and requests the Member States concerned
to inform the Secretary-General immediately of the measures they
take pursuant to the authorization conferred by this paragraph
which shall be immediately reported to the Security Council87
As sweeping as this paragraph may first appear, the pertinent
question becomes whether sorties targeting Gaddafi's civilian presi-
dential residence was in any way connected to civilian protection in the
absence of any proof that Gaddafi himself was directly involved in com-
bat or that his private residence was being used as military command
or served some other military purpose.8 8 Nor can it be proved that
members of Gaddafi's immediate family that died as a result of NATO
targeting Gaddafi could merely pass off as collateral damage. The
overall purpose of the intervention had been clouded from the begin-
ning because, apart from efforts to mobilize African States and the
League of Arab States to support Resolution 1973, these regional ac-
tors were side-lined in the implementation process. Lamenting the
situation, President Jacob Zuma of South Africa, who led the AU Com-
mittee on the Libyan crisis, said, "I think that the point we have been
making is that those who have a lot of capacity, even the capacity to
bombard the countries, really undermined the [African Union's] initia-
tives and effort to deal with the matter in Libya."89 Once African and
other state actors were manipulated into supporting the Resolution in
order to gain international legitimacy for the planned operations, and
once Resolution 1973 was adopted, a disguised license for regime
change in Libya was handed over to NATO.
That the scope of what was permitted by Resolution 1973 was
clearly exceeded by NATO, as demonstrated by the fact that every
other member state of the UN Security Council outside the NATO bloc
who voted for or abstained from Resolution 1973 subsequently con-
demned the enforcement modus operandi adopted by NATO. For
example, the Russian Foreign Minister said that the Resolution aimed
87. See supra note 83, at T 4. See also, 6 and 8 imposing a no fly zone and authorizing
the use of "all necessary measures" to enforce compliance. . (emphasis added).
88. Gareth Evans, When Intervening in a Conflict, Stick to UN Script, THE SIDNEY
MORNING HERALD, Mar. 24, 2011, http//www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics-intervening-in-
conflict-stick-to-un-script-20110323-lc6kz.html.
89. South Africa, War Crimes Court should Probe NATO role in Libya, DECAN HERALD,
Aug. 25, 2011, http://wwwdeccanherald.com/content/186211/war-crimes-court-should-
probe.htlm.
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at protecting civilians had been misused to pursue the removal of the
Gaddafi regime.90
Even the Arab League, which was the first to call for a "no-fly-
zone" over Libya, was forced to denounce the scale of attacks launched
on Libya by NATO in purported enforcement of the Resolution. 91 It is
questionable whether the motive behind the Obama Administration's
decision to champion the intervention without the direct deployment of
U.S. troops into Libya was driven by human rights considerations, or
whether, as has been strongly expressed by critics of the operation, it
was instead driven by a ploy to open up Libya's oil reserves for Ameri-
can interests. There is evidence lending credence to this latter
suspicion.
First, from the beginning of the intervention, there were mixed
signals from both the United States and other NATO members as to
what the possible scope of the intervention should be. At one point,
President Obama's Secretary of State, Mrs. Hillary Clinton, reportedly
said that arming the rebels was legal and within the scope of Resolu-
tion 1973, whereas President Obama himself was said to have thought
otherwise.92 Contradicting the United States in relation to arming the
rebels, the French Foreign Minister, Alain Juppe, said, "I remind you
that this is not what is envisaged by Resolution 1973. . . So for the
moment France has agreed to the strict application of these resolu-
tions."9 3 According to the United Kingdom's (UK) Foreign Secretary,
William Hague, the UK would not give arms to the rebels "in any form
[ ]at the moment. Our focus is on trying to protect those civilian areas
with the measures that we've been carrying out in the last ten days."94
This demonstrates the ambiguity of the Resolution, as well as the ulte-
rior motives behind the initial intervention. On the question of
whether Gaddafi could be legally targeted, NATO members also ini-
tially differed in their interpretation, but ultimately came to a
consensus by their subsequent conduct, with some commentators even
claiming that under Resolution 1973, Gaddafi was a legitimate target
90. Libya: NATO Defends Operation during Russia Talks, BBC NEWS, July 4, 2011,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14010305.
91. Amr Moussa called for an end to NATO bombings, arguing that it was killing
civilians including children. See Libya: Italy Urges Suspension of Hostilities, BBC NEWS,
Jun. 22, 2011, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13872674.
92. The BBC quoted U.S. Secretary of State, Mrs. Hillary Clinton, as saying, "[Ilt is our
interpretation that UN Security Council Resolution 1973 amended or overrode the absolute
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and could be killed by NATO.95 What is clear, however, is that NATO
had been programmed to topple Gaddafi and only the tactics changed
in course of the war.
In any case, these actions square with the two legs of President
Obama's foreign policy thrusts in Africa: the protection of human
rights and promotion of democracy. However, the extent to which the
end result would be in the interest of Africans beyond the the objec-
tives of the US to effectuate regime change in real or imagined
unfriendly African countries is a matter for conjecture. President
Obama has stated that "the future of Africa is up to Africans," but he
has pledged to partner with Africans to realize that future. 96 He has
remarked, "I see Africa as a fundamental part of our interconnected
world - as partners with America on behalf of the future that we want
for all our children. That partnership must be grounded in mutual re-
sponsibility."97 President Obama asserted that this partnership must
be based on a fundamental commitment that leads to the ability to
transform Africa by Africans.98 This mouthed partnership was a far
cry from the NATO intervention in which the views of the African
Union were ignored and its efforts to fashion an amicable solution be-
tween the rebels and the Libyan Government was deliberately
undermined by President Obama and NATO allies. According to Presi-
dent Obama, "[i]t is U.S. policy that Gaddafi has to go," and this is so
regardless of the consequences for the Libyan people and the implica-
tions for regional peace and stability.99 There was one important
factor to be considered and that was U.S. national interest. It is clear
that President Obama is following the same policy that previous U.S.
administrations have pursued for the past ten years, which is a policy
that is designed primarily to advance the United States' interests
rather than Africa's or both.oo
From revelations now emerging, it can be concluded that the
Obama Administration certainly had more than human rights protec-
95. Dapo Akande, What does UN Security Council Resolution 1973 Permit? EJIL TALK
available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/what-does-un-security-council-resolution-1973-permitl.
96. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to the Ghanaian Parliament,





99. Air Strikes Keep Pressure on Gaddafi, BBC NEWS, Mar. 22, 2011, http://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/world-africa-12814748.
100. Daniel Volman, Obama Expands Military Involvement in Africa, AFRICAN SECURITY
PROJECT, Apr. 2 2010, available at http://www.concernedafricascholars.org/african-security-
research-projectl.
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tion and the promotion of democracy on its mind when it ordered the
Libyan intervention. If the protection of civilians was the motive for
the intervention, then the mandate of resolution 1973 ought to have
been implemented with serious implications for both parties in the con-
flict -the Gaddafi regime and the Libyan North Transitional Council
(NTC) alike.10 1 But it seems the responsibility was only to "protect"
civilians against Gaddafi's forces while the rebels were free to engage
in wanton killings, violations of human rights, and international hu-
manitarian law. In the recently published Human Rights Watch
Report, evidence now abounds that while Government troops came
under heavy bombardment by NATO, in order to "protect" civilians,
the NTC rebels executed 53 Gaddafi supporters. 102 The report does not
mention whether these were soldiers or noncombatants. There were
reports of several dozens of arbitrary arrests, detention, torture, and
executions by the NTC. 103 The question is then, where was NATO?
While NATO was busy attacking government bases and forces in a des-
perate bid to swing the pendulum in favour of the rebels, many other
civilians that Resolution 1973 was meant to protect were being tor-
tured and executed. There is evidence that even NATO was responsible
for the killing of civilians it was meant to protect, though the exact
figure is unknown. 104 There are other instances where the deaths of
scores of civilians were linked to NATO attacks and occasions where
NATO neglected to rescue African migrants fleeing its bombing, 63 of
who died consequently. 105 These and other severe violations of human
rights and international humanitarian law by NATO forces require in-
vestigation by the UN and the International Criminal Court (ICC) but
in a world where might is right, this is unlikely to happen. There is no
doubt that the Gaddafi government was also equally guilty of atroci-
ties, but while he was swiftly indicted by the ICC which immediately
issued a warrant for his arrest, none of such warrant has been issued
against any of the rebel perpetrators.1 0 6 This raises questions about
101. This obviously drags R2P norm into the murky water of selective intervention that
has undermined and delegitimized the doctrine of humanitarian intervention all along and
which R2P was supposed to avoid.
102. HumAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2012 (Libya) 3 (January 2012) available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related-material/libya_2012.pdf.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 5.
105. Id.
106. Libya: Muammar Gaddafi Subject to ICC Arrest Warrant, BBC NEws, Jun. 27,
2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13927208.
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the legitimacy of the entire NATO intervention in Libya on president
Obama's watch.107
As controversial as this view might sound, we must observe
that as appealing as democracy might be, it is not yet part of an uncon-
tested principle of international law that there can be an external
intervention by the use of force to support per se, a people's demand for
democracy, or to change the form of social, economic or political organi-
sation of a state. 08 This still rests within the essential domestic
jurisdiction of the state concerned. 09 Until such a time when this be-
comes a part of international law norm, regime change under the guise
of enforcing the international community's responsibility to protect re-
mains illegal, whether or not powerful nations such as the U.S. support
it and particularly in the disproportionate manner that NATO un-
leashed its military might on Libya. There is no doubt that the
intervention was sanctioned by the UNSC to protect civilians. Leaving
aside the question of whether the situation in Libya actually consti-
tuted a threat to international peace and security, or whether NATO
was contracted to enforce Resolution 1973, it is beyond dispute that the
intervention was way beyond what Resolution 1973 contemplated and
according to Michael Walzer, ". . .a military attack of the sort now in
progress is defensible only in the most extreme cases".110
V. OBAMA AFRICA POLICY AND RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS IN AFRICA
The 1990s was a turbulent decade for Africa with the number of non-
international armed conflicts peaking between 1997 and 1999.11' The
New Millennium ushered in mixed feelings as some of the wars on the
continent were ending, however a few ferocious ones like Darfur en-
sued. Some observers therefore predicted a tough time for Africa in the
new decade. R Henderson had predicted this scenario a decade earlier
when he wrote
107. Michael Walzer, The Case Against Our Attack on Libya, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar.
20, 2011, http://www.tnr.com/article/world/85509/the-case-against-our-attack-libya.
108. While some authors have argued for the right to intervene in support of democracy,
the UN Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations adopted
on UN General Assembly 2625 (XXV) 24th October 1970 which now forms part of customary
international law is patently against democratic invasions.
109. One of the principles is the inalienable right of a state to choose its social, economic
and political system without interference from other states, and the duty of states to refrain
from fomenting or interfere in civil strife.
110. Walzer, supra note 108.
111. Wallensteen & Sollenberg, supra note 44, at 638
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With the U.S. as the last superpower with the capacity to project
military force globally and the lack of funds for United Nations In-
terventionist "peacemaking" operations, regional inter-
governmental organizations will increasingly have to assume the
responsibility for any regional right to interfere. They will have to
provide and project the military force necessary to support interna-
tional interventions for humanitarian purposes 112
One of the immediate challenges before the leaders of the Afri-
can Continent was an urgent need to fashion a workable mechanism
for the maintenance of peace and security in the region. The 10-year
old African Union (AU) successor to the Organisation of African Unity
launched its new Constitutive Act in 2000 and sought to create a mech-
anism for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the overall
maintenance of peace and security on the continent.113 This took place
at a time of great global change. First, a few years earlier, the Interna-
tional Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty had
published its report. 114 China was on the rise as a global power and the
balance of power was changing. Further, the terrorist attacks of Sep-
tember 11, 2011 had just occurred and the U.S. was smarting for war
both in Afghanistan and Iraq. It was clear that there would be a great
change in the global peace and security firmament and there was the
need for the US to re-engage Africa, as many of the countries there
were potential breeding ground for international criminality and
terrorism.115
Perhaps one important area the Obama Administration has
scored well in Africa was its ability to see to the implementation of the
2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement in the Sudan which success-
fully ended three decades of civil war between Northern and Southern
Sudan.1 16 President Obama's administration promised a committed
and proactive Africa policy.117 Yet for almost a year after assuming
office, the administration did not have a clear policy on resolving the
112. R Henderson, Democracy, Neo-authoritarianism and International Security, 26
CANADIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE COMMENTARY (1992), available at https://www.
csis.gc.ca/pblctns/cmmntr/cm26-eng.asp.
113. See The African Union Constitutive Act (2002).
114. See ICISS Report, supra note 71.
115. van de Walle, supra note 34, at 6.
116. The South seceded from the North in July 2011 after a referendum was held to
determine the in 2010 to determine the future of the South. Since then however, tension has
remained with occasional clashes over the oil-rich border province of Abyei.
117. Johnnie Carson, U.S.-Africa Policy Under the Obama Administration, Reimagine,
Redefine, Reinvent: A New Paradigm for African Leadership, Harvard University Africa
Focus Program Washington DC, April 5, 2010, available at http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rn
2010/139462.htm.
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Darfur conflict thereby raising doubts whether Obama would push
through his pre-election promise to end the Darfur tragedy."1 , There
has been a lull in the conflict and this is the time to push for a compre-
hensive resolution of the conflict. So far, Obama has adopted a
somewhat tentative partnership with the African Union. In 2010, for
example, the Obama administration signed a $5.8 million assistance
pact with the African Union to support the AU's peace and security
initiatives, among others.119 The U.S. is also supporting the AU in its
efforts to have a fully operational African Standby Force with regional
brigades across the continent. 120 At the same time, the administration
has continued the aggressive militarization of Africa initiated by previ-
ous U.S. administrations.
A. Militarization of Africa
As mentioned above, terrorist threats such as the bombing of
U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar res Salam in Tanzania
forced policymakers to reassess their view of U.S. Africa policy. 12 1
There were calls for a review of the policy of disengagement with Africa
and the need to develop a new U.S. Africa policy focusing on a robust
military component and partnership with African states. 122 In 2002,
both the State Department and the Pentagon outlined that Africa rep-
resented a source of national security threats to the United States.123
In assessing the underpinning themes of President Bush's 2002 Na-
tional Security Strategy, Ploch points out that the poverty and state of
hopelessness in Africa posed a threat to U.S. national security and its
global war on terror.124
118. Daniel Pepper, Darfur Activists Frustrated with Obama's Sudan Policy, TIME
WORLD, Thursday Oct. 22, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1931658,00.
html. See also Barron Young Smith, The Obama Administration Finally has an Official
Darfur Policy, but Where is Obama?, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 18 2009, http://www.tnr.com/
blog/the-plank/the-obama-administration-finally-has-official-darfur-policy-where%E2%80%
99s-obama.
119. Press Release, The United States and the African Union' Office of the Spokesman
Washington DC, (April 19 2011),) http://www.state.gov/r/palprs/ps/2011/04/161212.htm.
120. Id.
121. PLOCH, supra note 36, at 17.
122. See, e.g., The Report of the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on
International Relations 2001. "Africa and the War on Global Terrorism" Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations, House of
Representatives, 107th Cong. (15 November 2001) available at http://commdocs.house.gov/
committees/intlrellhfa76191.000/hfa76191 Of.htm.
123. Barnes, supra note 33, at 3.
124. PLOCH, supra note 36, at 14.
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In response to these and other national security concerns, the
U.S. established the Combined Joint Task Force, Horn of Africa, dedi-
cated to combating terrorism in the Horn of Africa region. 125 This Task
Force quickly expanded its area of operations to cover Seychelles, Mau-
ritius and Eritrea, establishing a permanent base at Camp Lemonier
in Djibouti and becoming the first U.S. permanent base in Africa after
several decades. 126 According to Berrigan
"[A]s part of the CJT-HOA these soldiers are also building schools,
digging wells and sanitizing slaughterhouses. Their work is deline-
ated by the four Ps and the three Ds: Prevent conflict, promote
regional stability, protect coalition interests and prevail against ex-
tremism in East Africa and Yemen through diplomacy,
development and defense"1 27
Undoubtedly, there is a gradual but steady militarization of Af-
rica as a policy that is being pursued by the U.S.: what we are left to
conjecture is its design, purpose and ultimate end. In 2005, the De-
fense Department Operation Enduring Freedom -Trans Sahara (OEF-
TS) set up the Pan Sahel Initiative to cover countries like Mali, Mauri-
tania, Niger and Chad.128 The Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism
Initiative (TSCTI) was funded to the tune of $500 million over a period
of six years. 129 For some time after the Cold War, the U.S. had sought
to establish its military presence in Africa given that all other regions
considered of strategic interest to the U.S. had a military command to
protect U.S. national interests and use force if necessary.130
The U.S. has built airbases and arms depots on the island of Diego
Garcia and is also discreetly building military surveillance facilities at
Tamanrasset in southern Algeria.13 The Clinton administration had
initially pursued the objective of establishing U.S. forces in Africa
through the African Crisis Response Force, but it was met with little
success as many African states, particularly the regional powers -
South Africa and Nigeria - were skeptical and unenthusiastic about
the policy. 132 Therefore, given the increasing importance of Africa to
the national security strategy of the U.S., it was recommended that a
125. van de Walle, supra note 34, at 7.
126. Id.
127. Frida Berrigan, Africa: The New Military Frontier (18 September 2007) http://
www.fpif.org/articles/the-new-military-frontier-africa.
128. van de Walle, supra note 34, at 7.
129. Berrigan, supra note 128.
130. Barnes, supra note 33, at 7.
131. Id.
132. Paul Omach, The African Crisis Response Initiative: Domestic Politics and
Convergence of National Interest, 99 AFR. AFF. 73, 80 (2000,).
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special Command be established for Africa to promote U.S. strategic
objectives.133 In October 2007, the Africa Command (AFRICOM) was
established by President Bush.134 Without getting into the full mission
statement, AFRICOM's mission statement says in part that the
[Ulnited States Africa Command, in concert with other U.S. govern-
ment agencies and international partners, conducts sustained
security engagement through military-to-military programs, mili-
tary sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed
to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of
U.S. foreign policy.135
The U.S. has worked to reassure African governments that
AFRICOM is not designed for war in Africa but at the same time, U.S.
top military officials' remarks point to a different direction. For exam-
ple, Rear Admiral Richard Hunt, the Commander of Combined Joint
Taskforce-Horn of Africa (or CJT-HOA), is quoted to have stated that
"Africa is the new frontier that we need to engage now, or we are going
to end up doing it later in a very negative way" 136
Consequently, it is doubtful whether the peace and security
challenges facing African states and the need to strengthen their mili-
tary capability to maintain regional stability were actually the driving
motives. For example, while the potential for cooperation and partner-
ship between AFRICOM and African militaries receive much
emphasis, little is heard of the combatant character of the command
and the other invasive purposes to which it could be put. Africans have
been rightly suspicious of the motives behind the creation of
AFRICOM. The reasons for this suspicion are not few. First, in the fea-
sibility study carried out prior to the creation of AFRICOM, only a brief
mention was made of what precautions would be taken in order to
make sure that the training and equipment provided to African mili-
taries are not used by the respective government to suppress internal
dissent or attack other states.137
The case of Equatorial Guinea and Uganda have been cited as
illustrating the danger inherent in this policy where one-party states
could deploy the military weapons and training provided to maintain
themselves in power and silence opposition. 138 The likelihood of such
133. Barnes, supra note 33, at 2; See also, The Testimony of EUCOM AOR before the
Senate Armed Services Committee (Sept. 19, 2006).
134. van de Wale, supra note 34, at 3.
135. PLOCH, supra note 36, at 1, quoting the AFRICOM mission statement.
136. Berrigan, supra note 127.
137. PLOCH, supra note 36, at 3.
138. Barnes, supra note 33, at 11.
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unintended consequences is real and would undermine U.S. objective
of promoting democracy and human rights in Africa.18 9 The concerns
expressed above about the dangers in unrestrained US-militarization
of Africa appear to be receiving the attention of commentators follow-
ing recent developments in Mali1 40 that occurred at the time of
finalizing this article. On March 22, 2012, the Malian soldiers led by
US-trained Captain Amadou Sanogo staged a coup to overthrow the
democratically elected government of Toumani Toure, ending a 20-year
period of fledgling democracy. 141 Until then, Mali was ranked as one of
the only few African countries to have attained the level of "flawed de-
mocracy" just a level beneath the 'full democracy' rank of the advanced
democracies of the West on the global democracy index in 2010.142
Secondly, why a combatant force if indeed the motive is capacity
building? There are concerns about the true intentions behind creating
a 'combatant' command if the purpose as proclaimed in the mission
statement of AFRICOM is basically to partner with African states to
provide training and capability to African militaries to ensure stability
in the States and the region. 143 Fourthly, AFRICOM says its own mis-
sion is to respond to crisis and help strengthen stability, security
capability, and capacity building. There is a lack of clarity as to the
scope of this mission and African states have been skeptical and have
therefore approached the partnership with caution. 144 AFRICOM has
engaged in war games and military exercises around the continent,
given that part of its mission is to lead military operations and deter
aggression. This has further heightened suspicions that AFRICOM
could well be serving some purposes other than Africa's stability.
Finally, the role AFRICOM played in the NATO-led interven-
tion in Libya has further lent credence to the argument that
AFRICOM was designed to further the U.S. interventionist agenda on
the African continent. Because of this suspicion, most African states,
139. Id.
140. Abayomi Azikiwe U.S.-NATO Policies Lead to Coup in Mali available at: http://
www.workers.org/2012/world/mali0405/.
141. See Mali Coup Leader Trained with U.S Military: Pentagon, AFRICA DAILY, Mar.
27, 2012, available at: http://www.africadaily.netireports/Malicoupleader-trained with
US-militaryPentagon_999.html. He had attended military training in the US in 1998,
2003, 2004, 2007 and 2010.
142. Democracy Index 2010: Democracy in Retreat, Report from the Economist
Intelligence Unit, 5 (2010) available at: http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/DemocracyIndex
2010_web.pdf p 5
143. Paul C Wright, U.S. Military Intervention in Africa: The New Blueprint for Global
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with the exception of Liberia, refused to grant AFRICOM bases in their
territories, as a result of which, it had to be located in Stuttgart in
Germany. The controversial intervention in Libya by the West was the
first military operation conducted by AFRICOM and to the delight of
the U.S., it vindicated itself by conducting several sorties and demon-
strating the capability to deploy at short notice (within 48 hours), and
Gaddafi was toppled. Is this the grand design behind the creation of
AFRICOM as rightly suspected by African states all along? This con-
tradicts Obama's statement of his policy when he said "[A] nd let me be
clear: our Africa Command is focused not on establishing a foothold in
the continent, but on confronting these common challenges to advance
the security of America, Africa and the world." 145
In the same speech President Obama had pledged to Africa that
his administration would 'partner through diplomacy, technical assis-
tance, and logistical support' to achieve peaceful resolution of conflicts
on the continent. 14 6 But it is difficult to reconcile this policy thrust
with the practice of the U.S. whereby it actively and covertly subverted
the efforts of the foremost regional organisation's efforts to find an am-
icable settlement to the Libyan crisis. Rather than the African Union,
the West, led by the U.S., found it more deserving to build an alliance
with the Arab League on resolving the Libyan crisis because it found
more elements within that organisation more amenable to the regime
change agenda of the U.S. Surely, this is not what it is to 'partner' and
'support'. The AU had made frantic efforts, though somewhat belat-
edly, to find a solution to the Libyan crisis, but a solution that would
probably leave Gaddafi in power was not acceptable to the U.S. and its
allies, not necessarily the Libyan people. Whatever the rationale, the
role of AFRICOM in the Libyan civil war has severely damaged its
credibility and relationship with its African partners, and it is unlikely
that it will get the elusive cooperation it has sought from African states
since it was established in 2007.147
In defending the decision to intervene in Libya, President
Obama said the Libyan case was unique in that it provided peculiar
circumstances that made it possible for coalition forces to unite to save
lives. 1 4 8 What he did not mention however, was the legality of arming
the rebels that was in clear violation of UNSC Resolution 1970 which
145. President Obama, supra note 97.
146. Id.
147. Jonathan Stevenson, AFRICOM's Libyan Expedition: How War will Change the
Command's Role on the Continent, Foreign Affairs (9 May 2011), http://www.foreignaffairs.
com/articles/67844/jonathan-stevenson/africoms-libyan-expedition.
148. BBC NEWS, supra note 87.
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imposed arms embargo on Libya, or was the arms embargo only en-
forceable against the Gaddafi regime?149 That such action violates said
Resolution and was even alluded to by the French Foreign Minister
Alain Juppe when he said that France was ready to discuss the possi-
bility of arming the rebels but that a new UNSCR would be obtained to
that effect. He had asserted, "I remind you that this [arming the
rebels] is not what is envisaged by Resolution 1973. . . so for the mo-
ment France has agreed to the strict application of these
resolutions. . .*"'o Though, France would go ahead to arm the rebels
without a supporting UNSC resolution, there was no doubt about the
legal interpretation of Resolution 1970 which forbade the supply of
arms to Libya whether it was for government troops or the rebels. This
further buttressed the argument that Obama manipulated an ambigu-
ous and vaguely worded UNSC resolution to effect regime change in
Libya and as such, his policy of resolution of conflict in Africa must be
approached with caution as it seems to be designed to serve not the
interest of Africa or Africans but that of the U.S. by getting rid of an
old foe like Gaddafi. The way the U.S. has pursued the militarization
of Africa highlights the strategic premium the continent now at-
tracts.15 The commitment of material and financial resources to the
process stands in contrast to the promotion of democracy and human
rights objectives components of Obama's Africa policy.
B. Protecting Corporate America
The interest of corporate America in Africa cannot be divorced
from the foreign policy thrust of any U.S. President, and Obama is no
exception. Powerful multinational corporations have influenced, and
continue to influence, U.S.-Africa policy and this has implications for
human rights. Multinationals are driven primarily by profit, hence
when the political operational environment is undemocratic; the first
casualty is human rights. Daniel Kaufman calls this "state capture".152
In his analysis of the capacity of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) to
149. S.C Res. 1970, S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26 2011.).
150. BBC NEWS, supra note 86.
151. With the creation of AFRICOM, the U.S. now has EUCOM, CENTCOM, PACOM
and AFRICOM completing the four legs of its global military power projection. See Frida
Berrigan, Africa: The New Military Frontier (Sept. 18, 2007) http://www.fpif.org/articles/
the new military frontier africa.
152. Daniel Kaufmann, Qaddafi's Corrupt Influence in the U.S.: International State
Capture, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Mar. 7, 2011) available at: http://www.brookings.edu/
opinions/2011//0307_qaddafikaufmann.aspx.
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influence the foreign policy directions of U.S. administration, Daniel
Kaufmann asserts
[tihere is still a particular dimension of state capture that goes rela-
tively unrecognized - the capture of states' foreign policies vis-a-vis
autocratic countries by multinationals and lobbyists who favor the
lenient treatment of these autocratic regimes so to pursue commer-
cial objectives. In short, I am talking about state capture in the
international arena or international state capture.153
There is no need to rehash the role of Corporate America in the
decision to invade Iraq. In fact, in Africa, MNCs have been known to
decide the political future of the governments of most resource-rich
countries. So much so that the executive of a MNC could boast about
the eventual fall of former Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Presi-
dent Laurent Kabila thus:
[W]e want that Kabila fellow out of there. We will soon get him out
... we are not alone in this. The USA and Canadian mining inter-
ests have also been let down ... and Mugabe can kiss good-bye any
suggestion that South Africa will support the so-called SADC allies
in the DRC ... We cannot allow Zimbabwe to usurp our interests in
the DRC1 54
So whatever human rights policy initiatives has been under-
taken by the Obama administration, it has been undertaken in the
narrow interest of corporate America and the larger interest of the
U.S. In Kaufmann's words "the ongoing crisis in Libya is exposing this
type of capture."155 So we have such groups as U.S.-Libya Business
Association (USLBA), which is notorious for its ability to mix deal-
making with diplomacy through U.S. embassies. While they smile to
the bank, Gaddafi continues in power, and the U.S. administration
looks the other way.156 Writing about Equatorial Guinea and how
MNCs, and not human rights, are a major driver of U.S.-Africa policy,
Barnes articulates this corporate influence and interest:
[Algain, Equatorial Guinea is instructive. At the same time that
experts warned the U.S. government not to repeat Cold War mis-
takes of propping up dictators, the State Department authorized a
private, for-profit military company of former Pentagon officers to
153. Id.
154. NAISON NGOMA, PROSPECTS FOR A SECURITY COMMUNITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: AN
ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY 160
(2005).
155. Kaufmann, supra note 153.
156. See Marcus Baram, Libyan Opposition Leaders Slam U.S. Business Lobby's Deals
With Gaddafi, HUFFINGTON POST BLOG available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/
24/muammar-gaddafi-us-business-lobby-n 827769.html.
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work with President Nguema to strengthen Equatorial Guinea's
Coast Guard and its ability to protect off shore oil operations being
conducted by Exxon. Nguema came to power through a coup; he
leads a one-party state; and he has been charged with glaring
human rights abuses. Yet relations with Equatorial Guinea were
reestablished at the urging of oil companies, and military expertise
was provided to help protect them.157
In defending his decision to send troops to Central Africa,
Obama says it is in the national security interest of the U.S.158 Could it
also be that following the recent discovery of oil in Uganda, oil majors
are already gearing up and, given the usual 'deal-making plus diplo-
macy' strategic equation, the Obama administration has sent the
troops as forerunners for the interest of corporate America in Uganda?
It is too early to tell, but what is certain is that whether it is for the
interest of national security or aimed at protecting corporate America,
the interest of Uganda, Central Africa and Africa was not the primary
consideration.
Sensing the future dangers such attitudes pose to their com-
mercial interests in Africa, some MNCs now adopt what Barnes calls a
'strategic philanthropy' policy in their African operational countries.
This still does not structurally alter the systemic polarity that fosters
and sustains endemic poverty and human rights violations in Africa or
the skewed international economic order that make it possible.15 9
VI. OBAMA AFRICA POLICY AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON
TERROR (GWOT)
As aptly put by Prendergast and rightly so in our view,
[Miuch as the Cold War defined U.S. foreign policy from the 1950s
until 1990, the global war on terrorism has become the dominant
paradigm for Bush administration foreign policy, and Africa is no
exception. This is slowly changing the nature of the Bush adminis-
tration policy towards Africa. In general terms, overt
democratization and human rights objectives appear to have been
downgraded, in favour of support to regimes that line up favourably
on counter-terrorism objectives and Iraq policy.1 60
157. Barnes, supra note 33, at 11.
158. Mareik Schomerus, Tim Allen, & Koen Viassenroot, Obama Takes on the LRA: Why
Washington Sent Troops to Central Africa, FOREIGN AFFAIRs (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/136673/mareike-schomerus-tim-allen-and-koen-vlassenroot/
obama-takes-on-the-Ira.
159. Barnes, supra note 33, at 15.
160. Prendergast, supra note 57, at 110.
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In 2004, the Africa Policy Advisory Panel, a group of experts on
Africa commissioned by Congress in 2003, produced a report noting
that "HIV/AIDS, terror, oil, armed conflicts, and global trade" have de-
termined the direction of U.S. foreign policy in Africa in the preceding
decade, resulting in a policy shift in the U.S.161 George Bush stated in
his 2002 National Security Strategy that the priority of his Africa pol-
icy is "combating global terror."162 President Barack Obama also stated
that combating terrorism is one of the priorities of his Administration's
policy on Africa.163 The Obama strategy on terrorism in Africa as out-
lined in the 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism says it is
designed to destroy Al Qaeda operations in Africa and helping to build
the capacity of African forces to serve as countermeasures against ter-
rorists and their allies within the region. 164 This will effectively make
African forces the first line of defense in the U.S. war on terror in the
continent while the U.S. plays the role of a supervening
counterweight. 6 5
Africa has remained on the U.S. radar of global war on terror
since the terrorist bombings of U.S. embassies in Dar res Salam,
Tanzania and Nairobi in Kenya in 1998. The activities of Al-Qaeda in
the Maghreb (AQIM) and Al Shabab have worried U.S. policymak-
ers.166 Thus, the Obama policy has largely continued the Bush policy
that focused on building domestic security and intelligence capabilities
of African states through bilateral engagement and alliances to help
combat terrorism as they arise in Africa and before reaching American
soil.167 The 2006 National Security Strategy identified Africa as "a
high priority" and concluded that U.S. national security rested on forg-
ing a partnership with Africans to 'strengthen fragile and failing states
and bring ungoverned areas under the control of effective
democracies."168
161. J. Stephen Morrison, Overview, in RISING U.S. STAKES IN AFRICA: SEVEN
PROPOSALS TO STRENGTHEN U.S.-AFRICA POLICY 2 (Walter H Kansteiner III & J
Stephen Morrison eds.) (2004), available at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/rising-u.s.
stakes inafrica.pdf. (Hereafter Kansteiner & Morrison RISING U.S. STAKES IN
AFRICA).
162. PLOCH, supra note 36, at 14.
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164. ExEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM, Jun. 14, 2011, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
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One of the focus areas of Obama's U.S.-Africa policy is to com-
bat terrorism on the continent. To this end, the U.S. has sought to
partner with its allies, and financial aid to countries like Ethiopia, Ke-
nya, has increased significantly, with an eye on combating Al Shabab
in Somalia. As part of this policy, the U.S. actively supported the incur-
sion made by Ethiopia into Somalia to fight the Al Shabab Islamists.
The militarization of Africa, particularly the Horn of Africa, is targeted
at tackling Al-Qaeda operatives in this region. It is also the reason be-
hind the provision of military training and equipment to these
countries. In effect they have become a 'layer' in the U.S. global war on
terror. 169 The need to focus on Africa as a partner on the war on terror
was first developed by Paul Wolfowitz during the Bush Administra-
tion. He had stressed the need to partner with Africa and help it
strengthen its institutions to defeat terrorism. 170 The theory is that the
evolution of terrorist cells in East, West and Southern Africa consti-
tutes a threat to the U.S., and to the world.171
The U.S. has therefore focused on Somalia in its counter-terror-
ism efforts in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia is the strategic centre of the
U.S. Horn of Africa Counter-terrorism policy and Djibouti is the logisti-
cal nerve centre.172 Ethiopia provides intelligence about different
groups in the region while Djibouti hosts a number of U.S. military and
intelligence personnel. Kenya and Uganda are becoming more drawn
into the networks to counter Al-Qaeda in the region. As a result of
this, other objectives in the region have been downgraded. Democracy
is no longer as strongly emphasised in Uganda, Rwanda and Ethio-
pia. 173 The U.S. involvement in Somalia outside counterterrorism has
been minimal, and it has not been engaged in the DRC despite the
magnitude of the crisis. 174
In fact, it is a confirmation of this that the U.S. Congress re-
cently released a report stating that the Boko Haram activities in
Nigeria are a threat to U.S. national security, thus paving the way for
both military and material resources to be channelled to combating
those activities by the U.S. At the time of writing, the U.S. is engaged
in intense collaboration with the Nigerian government to work out a
169. Id. at 15.
170. Deputy Sec'y of Def. Paul Wolfowitz, Remarks at the Africa Center for Strategic
Studies (Feb. 9, 2004), available at http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?Speech
JD=98.
171. Ritt Goldstein, Africa, Oil, Al Qaeda and the U.S. Military (Mar. 30, 2004),
available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/FrontPage/FC30AaO2.html.
172. Prendergast, supra note 57, at 110.
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comprehensive security policy for cooperation, integration, and assis-
tance, and, perhaps, some have mentioned intervention. It is
interesting to note that the U.S. focus on security is two-pronged - se-
curing oil facilities and investment in the Niger Delta, and because of
the recent activities of Boko Haram, combating terrorism in the North
by creating a section for it in the security partnership.175 This is the
reason the Obama Administration has pursued a policy of arming Afri-
can militaries while it expands its own military presence in the
continent.176 Since the inception of the U.S. war on terror, it is esti-
mated that it has spent over $1.238 trillion and just five percent of this
was spent on aid to foreign countries.1 77
The reason for connecting Africa to the war on terror is not far-
fetched. Africa, which has a huge Muslim population, with most living
in extremely poor countries, could easily become a breeding ground for
terrorists with fundamentalist Islamic persuasion, hence the need to
build up Africa's capacity to help the U.S. fight its war. 178 It is there-
fore only in response to combating terrorism that the U.S. has
increased aid to Africa and African militaries since the Clinton era and
the creation of the numerous counterterrorism outfits across Africa.179
Besides this, Obama does not really bring anything tangibly new to
U.S.-Africa policy. The fight against terrorism, HIV/AIDS, the promo-
tion of democracy, good governance and human rights, and the rule of
law have featured in the rhetoric of previous administrations, but U.S.
policy will ultimately be guided by strategic and economic interests.1 8 0
Apart from the fact that Africa was not a highpoint in his election-
eering campaign, the fact that financial crisis and budget deficit cuts
had hit the U.S. for most of the Obama administration also means that
Obama has little financial leverage to engage Africa.18 1
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VII. CHINA, OBAMA's AFRICA POLICY, AND THE RESOURCE RACE
Besides counterterrorism, the other important driver of U.S.-Africa
policy is energy security. 182 The rise of China is changing the geostra-
tegic calculations in Africa and a resource race between the U.S. and
China is fast driving the new scramble for African oil and markets. 83
The argument that oil is a national security matter for the U.S. was
advocated by former Assistant Secretary for Africa, Walter Kansteiner
and his defense counterpart, Michael Westphal under the Bush Ad-
ministration. 184 They linked uninterrupted oil supplies to U.S.
national security and were thus able to drive a policy that would not
only increase funding but also permit the use of force to protect oil sup-
plies.s8 5 About twenty percent of global oil production could come from
West Africa and central Africa, particularly Nigeria, Gabon and Equa-
torial Guinea and Angola in Southern Africa within the next 10 years if
the environment remains investment-friendly.xae African oil supplies
are increasing, and as the Middle East becomes more volatile, it is a
more likely alternative for energy security.187 Just as terrorism drives
U.S. policy in countries of the Horn of Africa, countries like Nigeria,
which is currently the fifth largest supplier of oil to the U.S., have be-
come more and more important as U.S. dependence on African oil
increases.188
Other emerging producers like Angola and Equatorial Guinea
now feature prominently in U.S.-Africa policy and the increasing need
to focus its policy on the Gulf of Guinea, which is believed to be the
next hub of oil explorations.189 As mentioned above, Africa is being mil-
itarized by the U.S. but it is only when related to the covert war to
secure Africa's oilfields that that militarization makes sense. As stated
by a top U.S. military official in 2003 "a key mission for U.S. forces (in
182. Sam Raphael & Doug Stokes, Globalizing West African Oil: U.S. 'Energy Security'
and the Global Economy, 87:4 INT'L AFF. 903, 907 (2011) (Hereafter, Raphael & Stokes
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Africa) would be to ensure that Nigeria's oil fields ... are secure."190 In
all of these, Africa, and Africa's interests have hardly been featured,
save wherever it converges with U.S. national interests, such as train-
ing African militaries to combat terrorism (but with little attention to
the human rights records of allies in the war on terror such as Egypt
under Mubarak, or Angola, but which enjoy close relations with the
U.S. based on U.S. strategic and energy security interests,
respectively).
The reason Gaddafi was taken out was not just because the U.S.
or NATO allies wanted the human rights of Libyans protected, as
much as it wanted to see an old and strong foe of the U.S. and the west
gone when the opportunity presented itself. Now, Western oil compa-
nies have lined up to carve up the spoils of war.19 ' This will explain the
suspicion that no matter the level of atrocities attributed to the NTC, it
is unlikely that perpetrators on its side would be held to account, as
doing so would undermine a regime the U.S. had helped to install. A
recent Amnesty Reports shows how TNC troops committed human
rights and international humanitarian law violations but no indict-
ment or warrant of arrest has come from the ICC as of yet.192
The activities of multinational corporations such as
ChevronTexaco, Halliburton, and ExxonMobil are engaged in human
rights violations in African countries. In fact, according to Daniel Kauf-
man, U.S. diplomacy and human rights policy has always been
influenced by corporate interests.s93 U.S. Corporations are not only in-
volved in human rights violations in Africa, some of them have
captured the regulatory, legislative, and monitoring authorities of the
African host states.194 Even while the war in Libya was still raging,
Western officials and business executives from multinational corpora-
tions were already manoeuvring to secure juicy oil and state
reconstruction deals.195
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For obvious reasons, the U.S. now critically depends on Africa's
oil.196 Hundreds of thousands of jobs in the U.S. depend on the con-
stant oil supply, from Africa and American Big Power firms like
ExxonMobil and ChevronTexaco are investing billions of dollars in Af-
rica's oil sector that needs to be protected.197 It stands to reason that
the Obama Administration is pursuing a policy of militarization prima-
rily to protect these American commercial interests by force if
necessary. The restive Niger Delta of Nigeria and Cabinda of Angola
pose severe threats to oil supplies and fears of interruptions are clearly
woven into the U.S. militarization of Africa policy. As the potential for
conflict between Iran and Israel in the Persian Gulf escalates, Africa's
profile as a major player in the global energy markets is bound to rise.
With this projection, the objective of the U.S. through EUCOM, NATO,
and now AFRICOM, has been to ensure energy security and access to
sea lanes for Africa's oil supplies. 198 As observed by Barnes, "there are
no provisions in the new strategic philanthropy to address the systemic
power imbalance in the global flows of capital that produce and
reproduce African poverty. This structural imbalance-nothing more,
nothing less-is the Achilles heel of global economic and political sys-
tems today."199
This assertion is still true under the Obama Administration,
where there is no significant policy trade initiative (apart from AGOA)
to promote free trade for Africa and help it overcome the conditions
that recreate the vicious cycle of poverty, suggesting that the oppo-
nents of free trade within the Obama Administration and party are
still dominant. 200
Obama is being pressured to take more proactive steps in Africa
as other global competitors, especially China, become more visible on
the continent. 201 Obama has scarcely initiated any new Africa pro-
gramme of his own, and has basically focused on funding those begun
by previous administrations. 202
As the Chinese economy expands, China is seeking new energy
and raw materials as well as markets for its export-led industrialisa-
196. GOLDWYN & MORRISON, supra note 184, at 8-11.
197. Id. at 12.
198. Barnes, supra note 33, at 6.
199. Id. at 15.
200. van de Walle, supra note 34, at 17.
201. James Butty, Assessing Obama's Africa Policy, Looking at 2012 and Beyond, VOICE




FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW
tion and it has rightly identified Africa as its top priority. 203 China's
investment in Africa has topped $50 billion; it has written off billions of
dollars in debt owed by poor African countries, providing loans without
conditionalities and building roads and railways and other infrastruc-
ture across Africa at high speed.204 Chinese investment in Nigeria's
and Sudan's oil sectors stands at $3 billion and $10 billion, respec-
tively.205China is strategising for political influence, strategic mineral,
market and oil in Africa. 206 Given the West's colonial and post-colonial
legacy in Africa, it seems many African countries are opting for the
Chinese model of loans without strings, unlike the IMF/World Bank,
and the OAD of Western nations that come with political and economic
control.207 This is what is fuelling the current resource race in Africa.
There is, however, the fear and danger of China promoting its com-
mand style capitalism, which many autocratic African governments
might find more attractive than the so-called democratic capitalism
model prescribed by the West and the Bretton Woods Institutions. 2 0 8
The Obama Administration does not emphasize the fact that its
Africa policy is driven by the twin concerns of terrorism and oil, yet the
indisputable fact is that Africa per se is not an important consideration
for the U.S., outside the context of oil and counterterrorism partner-
ship.209 The U.S. sends arms to the Transitional Federal Government
of Somalia and Ethiopia to combat Al Shabab but the DRC has hardly
received any significant attention.210
VIII. CONCLUSION: U.S. PoLICY, HuMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA AND THE
DEATH OF AN IDEA
Throughout history, U.S.-Africa policy has been a one-dimensional
arrangement viewed through the prism of U.S national interest, be it
economic or strategic. Africa has never been important in its own
rights and the internationalization of human rights and its ascendancy
on U.S. foreign policy agenda has not changed that. As is characteristic
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of U.S. foreign policy elsewhere, the Obama Administration policy on
Africa has been characterised by double-standards and lip-service and
he has simply continued where previous administrations left off. The
Arab Spring is evidence of this. Whereas Gaddafi was swiftly indicted
by the ICC and attempts were made to kill him when it became diffi-
cult to topple him, President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen was given a
free passage to visit the U.S. despite presiding over the killing of hun-
dreds of civilians in Yemen. 2 11 Gaddafi remained a sponsor of
terrorists in the eyes of the U.S., a man that would pursue weapons of
mass destruction any day and prepared to use oil as an economic
weapon against U.S commercial and national interests. So, the upris-
ing and an ambiguous UNSC resolution was the perfect opportunity to
secure long-term U.S interests in Libya.
Whenever the U.S. has had to use force purportedly in the pro-
tection of human rights in Africa, whether overtly or covertly through
the CIA, its economic and strategic interests have been the driving mo-
tives. While the U.S. propped up some of Africa's worst dictators and
still supports others on the continent for obvious U.S. interests, these
policies are often disguised in the garb of 'promoting human rights and
democracy'. Yoweri Museveni of Uganda is a staunch ally of the U.S.,
and the Obama Administration recently sent 100 U.S. Special Forces
to help Uganda capture or kill Jospeh Kony, the leader of the Lord
Resistant Army rebel group responsible for some of the worst atrocities
in Uganda, and the Central African region. Apart from the fact that
the Obama administration has continued to ignore the DRC, Museveni
runs a one-party state and he can only compare to Robert Mugabe in
his high handedness against opposition and political dissent. Yet,
Museveni does not attract criticism or sanctions. The discovery of oil in
Uganda therefore appears to be main attraction in a fast changing
world where new global powers are emerging at a time when the Amer-
ican economic hegemony is in decline. The competition for natural
resources and the need to secure these resources have led to an intense
struggle between newcomers like China and are threatening to rede-
fine the strategic and economic relations between Africa and the West.
Not surprisingly, the U.S. has responded with swift projection of its
militarization of the African continent with a military machine spread
across the continent and ready to launch 'humanitarian intervention'
to enforce the responsibility to 'protect' Africans when in fact, the mo-
211. Yemen's President Saleh Arrives in U.S. for Treatment, BBC NEWS (Jan. 29, 2012),
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tive is the defense of the interest of corporate America and protection
of the energy sources of the U.S. In all of these, Africa's interest rarely
counts and human rights in Africa will always be sacrificed on the al-
tar of U.S. national interest regardless of what President Obama
Africa policy purports.
